The Statutory Public Interest in Closing the Pay Gap by Bornstein, Stephanie
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2019
The Statutory Public Interest in Closing the Pay
Gap
Stephanie Bornstein
University of Florida Levin College of Law, bornstein@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephanie Bornstein, The Statutory Public Interest in Closing the Pay Gap, 10 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 1 (2019)
1 
ALABAMA CIVIL RIGHTS & 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 10.1 2019 
THE STATUTORY PUBLIC INTEREST  
IN CLOSING THE PAY GAP 
Stephanie Bornstein* 
 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 2 
 
I.  STATUTORY APPROACHES AND PUBLIC INTERESTS .................................. 6 
A. Two Routes to Remedy Pay Discrimination: Title VII and the Equal Pay Act ...... 6 
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act, the Public Interest, and Nonwaivable Rights ...... 11 
C. The Equal Pay Act as a Subset of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Its Interests 16 
 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYER PAY-SETTING PRACTICES ...................... 21 
A. The Modern Pay Gap as a Matter of Public Interest ........................................ 21 
B. Employer Pay-Setting Practices as Impermissible Waivers of FLSA Rights ......... 25 
1. Setting Pay by Individual Negotiation ............................................ 25 
2. Setting Pay by Prior Salary ............................................................. 29 
 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 32 
 
  
                                                   
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For their 
helpful comments and questions on presentations or drafts of this Essay, my sincere 
thanks to Deborah Brake, Mary Anne Case, Andrea Ritchie, Adam Romero, and the 
student editors of and participants in the 2018 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law 
Review Symposium. My thanks, as well, to Dale Dowden for his invaluable research 
assistance. 
2 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the fight for gender equality, compensation discrimination has been a 
perennial problem. Women have always worked outside of the home, particularly 
women of color, single women, and women whose income was needed to support 
their families.1 For these women, work both before industrialization (for example, as 
domestic laborers) and after (for example, as factory workers) was often undervalued 
and, correspondingly, underpaid.2 For more affluent women, Victorian Era notions 
of domesticity and separate spheres created the expectation that they should focus 
on the home and leave the market sphere to their husbands.3 This gendered division 
of labor reinforced the idea that women were less “suited” for the workplace and 
that their work was for extra “pin money” rather than a serious contribution to 
family income.4 Again, the result was an undervaluation of women’s market work, 
resulting in lower pay.5  
Inequality in women’s pay took center stage in the mid-twentieth century 
due to women’s greater participation in the paid workforce during World Wars I 
and II.6 Because so many men left work to serve in the wars, jobs that had been filled 
traditionally by men became open to women.7 And because both wars required a 
significant increase in U.S. production of war-related goods like ammunition and 
                                                   
1. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1981) (describing the history of working women). 
 2. See, e.g., id.; Claudia Goldin & Kenneth Sokoloff, Women, Children, and Industrialization in 
the Early Republic: Evidence from the Manufacturing Censuses, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 741, 742-74 
(1982) (“Women and children located in predominantly agricultural areas were widely 
perceived as a cheap source of labor for the expanding manufacturing sector.” Id. at 
759). 
 3. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–3, 23–24 (2000). 
 4. See id. at 24. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See MARIA L. ONTIVEROS ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 375-78 (9th 
ed. 2016) (citing RUTH MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB 
SEGREGATION BY SEX DURING WORLD WAR II 1 (David Broody et al. ed. advisors, 
1987); Cathryn L. Claussen, Gendered Merit: Women and the Merit Concept in Federal 
Employment, 1864-1944, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 229, 233 (1996)); David Freeman 
Engstrom, “Not Merely There to Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws, Collective Rights, and the 
Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14–15, 65–66 (2018). 
 7. See ONTIVEROS ET AL., supra note 6, at 375–78. 
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airplanes, new jobs were created—with only women there to fill them.8 Once 
women performed jobs previously occupied by men, but at a lower rate of pay, sex-
based pay discrimination became obvious, inspiring calls to remedy the problem.9 
Among those working to end unequal pay were predominantly male unions, who 
feared their male members would return from war to find their wages “eroded” by 
the presence of women in the same jobs or, worse, to find themselves replaced by 
cheaper female labor.10  
Despite years of advocacy and advancement at the state level, it was not 
until the mid-1960s that the federal legislature acted to redress unequal pay.11 Since 
then, federal law has prohibited sex discrimination in pay through two parallel 
mechanisms: the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)12 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII).13 Enacted within one year of each other, the statutes offer 
two different paths for employees to challenge sex-based pay discrimination.14 The 
EPA was codified as an amendment to the already existing Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (FLSA).15 It requires “equal pay” for “equal work” regardless of sex as 
a minimum labor standard for all covered employers, unless the employer can prove 
that the disparity was not based on sex.16 In contrast, Title VII created a new 
framework that grew out of the Civil Rights Movement to prohibit intentional 
discrimination because of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.17 Under 
Title VII, employees can allege sex discrimination in compensation (as well as hiring, 
firing, and other terms and conditions of work), which the employee must prove was 
the result of discrimination.18  
                                                   
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See MILKMAN, supra note 6, at 74–77; Engstrom, supra note 6, at 65–72 (describing 
unions’ “conflicted position on pay equity” and the impetus to prevent discrimination 
against men). 
 11. See ONTIVEROS ET AL, supra note 6, at 378; Engstrom, supra note 6, at 47–83. 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17 (2012). 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (2012). 
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A. 
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Thus federal law offers two routes to challenge sex discrimination in pay, 
each with its own strategic advantages and disadvantages for employee plaintiffs.19 
For over three decades, the two laws, along with women’s advancement in education 
and work experience, have helped equalize pay between men and women.20 In one 
measure of the gender pay gap,21 women working year-round full-time went from 
earning, on average, 57 cents on the dollar of similarly-situated men in 1973 to 
earning 75 cents on the dollar in 2000.22 Yet for the past two decades, advancement 
has stalled, with little improvement in women’s earnings as compared to men’s and 
a pay ratio stuck at 75 to 80 cents on the dollar since 2000.23 Beginning in the 1970s, 
more plaintiffs have pursued sex-based pay discrimination claims under Title VII 
than under the EPA, viewing Title VII’s strategic advantages to outweigh those of 
the EPA.24 The persistence of the gender pay gap, however, has sparked renewed 
interest in the EPA and legislative efforts to strengthen its protections.25 Reviving the 
EPA would allow plaintiffs to benefit from its strongest advantage over Title VII: a 
burden-shifting approach that, once a plaintiff-employee makes out a prima facie 
                                                   
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. The gender pay gap is the difference between what men and women earn and can be 
measured in a variety of ways. The most aggregated statistic compares the annual pay 
of all women working full-time year-round to all men doing the same, to come up with 
an average overall pay gap. Critics dispute this measurement; yet no matter how finely 
you parse the data, a wide array of economists document that some pay gap remains. 
This holds true even after controlling for education, experience, work hours, age, race, 
and geography, and even when comparing two similarly-situated employees 
performing the same job. See Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 
588–602 (2018) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Equal Work]. Some specific data on the 
current gender pay gap is provided in Part II.A of this Essay. However, a complete 
discussion of data supporting the gender pay gap is beyond the scope of this Article, 
which starts from the proven proposition that a gender pay gap exists. For a detailed 
discussion of current data on the pay gap, and a response to its critics, see id. 
 22. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY 
GAP 4 (Spring 2018), 
https://www.aauw.org/aauw_check/pdf_download/show_pdf.php?file=The_Simple
_Truth.  
 23. See id. The gender pay gap is greater for African-American and Latina women than for 
white and Asian-American women. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See infra Part I.A, II.B. 
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case, requires the defendant-employer to disprove, rather than the employee to prove, 
discrimination.26  
Yet there is another significant but unexamined advantage to the EPA, 
based on its enactment as a subsection within the Fair Labor Standards Act rather 
than the Civil Rights Act: a limitation on an employee’s ability to waive its 
protections. When Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938, its goal was not solely to 
create individual private rights of action for exploited workers, but also to serve 
important public interests—to root out unfair competition, balance employer-
employee bargaining power, and improve public health and welfare in the wake of 
the Great Depression.27 As a result, the FLSA prohibits employees from agreeing to 
accept less than the statutorily required minimum wage or waiving their rights to 
receive overtime pay, as a matter of public interest.28 When the EPA was enacted in 
1963, Congress identified similar goals, raising concerns about the underpayment of 
female workers whose income was essential to their families’ economic security and 
the U.S. economy as a whole.29 Federal courts have held that, like under the FLSA, 
employees cannot waive their rights under the EPA.30 
This Essay explores the role that the statutory public interest should play in 
the enforcement of rights under the EPA. Current data shows that, even fifty-five 
years after the enactment of federal law outlawing sex based pay discrimination, the 
gender pay gap inflicts huge costs on women, their families, and the U.S. economy, 
echoing the public concerns that led to the statute’s original passage.31 That FLSA 
and EPA rights cannot be waived by an employee calls into question two common 
employer pay-setting practices often excused under federal law: setting pay by 
individual negotiation and basing pay on an employee’s prior salary. As this Essay 
argues, both practices unfairly benefit employers due to unequal information and 
bargaining power; as such, allowing them to excuse unequal pay constitutes a forced 
waiver of an employee’s EPA rights. Part I of this Essay reviews existing law under 
Title VII and the EPA before turning to examine the statutory public interests and 
related limitations on waiver of FLSA and EPA rights. Part II applies these 
considerations to the modern workplace, first identifying the public interests in 
                                                   
 26. See infra Part I.A. 
 27. See infra Part I.B. 
 28. See infra Part I.B. 
 29. See infra Part I.C. 
 30. See infra Part I.C. 
 31. See generally JESSICA MILLI ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, THE IMPACT 
OF EQUAL PAY ON POVERTY AND THE ECONOMY (Apr. 2017), https://iwpr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/C455.pdf (discussing the consequences of the gender pay 
gap). 
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closing today’s gender pay gap, then considering employer pay-setting practices 
through the lens of the nonwaivability of EPA rights. 
Importantly, this Essay in no way seeks to advocate for a protectionist 
approach or to imply that women need special treatment in compensation practices. 
Instead it seeks to expose a significant proportion of the gender pay gap for what it 
actually is: the result of unfair competition and unfair labor practices that injure the 
public interest and the U.S. economy. Just as a law that requires a minimum wage 
and an overtime premium for all workers is not “protection” for a special group but, 
instead, a minimum labor standard that helps the entire U.S. economy, so too is a 
law that requires for equal pay regardless of sex. Underpaying female workers—who 
now compose nearly half of the paid workforce and provide 40 to 100% of 
household income in half of all families with children32—hurts the entire U.S. 
economy. Both the FLSA and the EPA were passed with the public concern in mind; 
it is time to revisit this intention. 
I. STATUTORY APPROACHES AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 
A. Two Routes to Remedy Pay Discrimination: Title VII and the Equal Pay Act 
Since the mid-1960s, two separate federal statutes, the Equal Pay Act33 and 
Title VII,34 have prohibited sex discrimination in compensation. Enacted as part of 
two, complementary statutory efforts, each provides its own strategic advantages and 
disadvantages to employees seeking to redress sex-based pay discrimination. For the 
most part, Title VII has been the more popular of the two approaches among 
plaintiffs; in recent years, however, there has been a renewed interest in the EPA.35  
Enacted in 1963 as an amendment to the FLSA of 1938, the EPA prohibits 
sex discrimination as a matter of wage and hour law. To bring a discrimination claim 
under the EPA, a plaintiff employee or group of employees must make out a prima 
facie case that, “within any establishment,” they are paid different wages than 
members of the opposite sex “for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 
working conditions.”36 This is not an easy standard to meet. First, any comparison 
must be within the same “distinct physical place of business,” which may exclude 
                                                   
 32. Id. 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17 (2012). 
 35. See Deborah L. Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness: Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex 
Defense Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 890, 890–92 (2016).  
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).  
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even different branch offices of the same employer.37 Second, to perform under 
“similar working conditions” means that only jobs performed with the same 
likelihood of physical hazards or potential injuries can be compared, and usually 
excludes jobs performed for different lengths of time or during different hours.38 
Third, and most limiting, “equal work” that “requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility” has been interpreted narrowly.39 While federal regulations suggest 
this analysis “does not require that compared jobs be identical, only that they be 
substantially equal,”40 as applied, federal courts have expected female plaintiffs to 
produce evidence of a near-identical male comparator who is paid more.41  
The narrow focus of the EPA’s prima facie case excludes a great many 
employees who may believe they have experienced sex discrimination in pay but 
cannot produce an exact comparator. If, however, a plaintiff-employee is able to 
make out a prima facie case, the EPA provides a strategic advantage: the burden of 
proof shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant-employer, who must now disprove 
discrimination using an affirmative defense.42 The employer can argue that the pay 
disparity was not discriminatory by showing that it was based on a system of 
                                                   
 37. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (2012); see, e.g., Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 797 
(S.D. Tex. 1998) (explaining that the same “establishment” in the EPA generally 
excludes multiple offices of the same business). 
 38. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(a) (2018); see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204 
(1974) (holding that shift differentials do not themselves violate the EPA); Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Altmeyer’s Home Stores, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 201, 214 (W.D. 
Pa. 1987) (allowing disproportionately lower pay for part-time employees). But see Lovell 
v. BBNT Sols., LLC, 295 F Supp. 2d 611, 620–11 (E.D. Va. 2003) (requiring 
proportionate pay for part-time employees). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER 
THAN SEX” LOOPHOLE IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT (2011), 
https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/4.11.11_factor_other_than_sex_fact_
sheet_update.pdf. 
 40. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2018). 
 41. See Equal Work, supra note 21 at 585–86. In other work, I argue that, even under existing 
law, courts could interpret the “equal work” provision more broadly than they 
currently do. See id. at 629–30. 
 42. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Lenihan, 994 F. Supp. at 797–98 (“Unlike an EPA claim . . . to 
prevail on a wage discrimination claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that 
the employer acted with discriminatory intent,” and, unlike a Title VII claim, “if the 
plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case [under the EPA], the burdens of 
production and persuasion shift to the employer to demonstrate as an affirmative 
defense that the difference in wages is justified by one of the exceptions specified under 
the Act.”). See also Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195–97 (1974) (describing burdens 
in collective actions). 
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“seniority[,] . . . merit[,] . . . [or] earnings by quantity or quality of production[,]” 
or—in the most sweeping of the statute’s affirmative defenses—that it was “based 
on any other factor other than sex.”43 This “any other factor” defense has been the 
subject of much criticism and is blamed, in large part, for the limitations of the EPA’s 
reach.44 In particular, as discussed in Part II, two common pay-setting practices 
thought to contribute to the gender wage gap—setting pay by individual negotiation 
and basing pay on an employee’s prior salary—have, in many federal courts, been 
excused under this defense.45 
  Offering a different approach to pay discrimination claims, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196446 prohibits sex discrimination in compensation using an 
antidiscrimination, rather than a minimum labor standards, approach. Title VII 
prohibits discrimination “because of” race, color, national origin, sex or religion in 
hiring, firing, terms and conditions of employment, and “compensation.”47 Plaintiffs 
can use one or more of three legal theories to make out a claim of pay discrimination 
under Title VII: individual disparate treatment alleging intentional discrimination 
in pay, pattern-or-practice disparate treatment alleging systemic discrimination on 
behalf of a group, or disparate impact alleging that an employer’s “facially neutral” 
policies or practices are disproportionately harming members of a protected class.48 
                                                   
 43. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(ii)–(iv) (2012).  
 44. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 35, at 892–901. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17 (2012). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL, SECTION 10: COMPENSATION DISCRIMINATION 10-III n.13 (2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html (“‘Compensation’ [under 
Title VII] has the same meaning as ‘wages’ under the EPA” and includes ‘wages, salary, 
overtime pay; bonuses; vacation and holiday pay; cleaning or gasoline allowances; hotel 
accommodations; use of company car; medical, hospital, accident, life insurance; 
retirement benefits; stock options, profit sharing, or bonus plans; reimbursement for 
travel expenses, expense account, [or other] benefits.’”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.12(a) 
(“The term wage ‘rate,’ as used in the EPA . . . is considered to encompass all rates of 
wages whether calculated on a time, commission, piece, job incentive, profit sharing, 
bonus, or other basis.”). 
 48. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (individual disparate 
treatment); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(pattern-or-practice disparate treatment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 
U.S. 299, 301 (1977)) (same); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) 
(disparate impact)). A few courts have indicated that, because of the inclusion of the 
Bennett Amendment in Title VII (discussed in text accompanying infra notes 54–60), 
sex-based pay discrimination claims should not be pursued under Title VII using a 
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For the most common type of Title VII pay claim—a claim of individual disparate 
treatment—an employee plaintiff must prove that she was qualified, performing 
satisfactorily, and paid too little, under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination.49 Often, this inference is created, as under the EPA, with evidence 
of a similarly-situated “comparator” outside of the protected class—for example, a 
male employee—who was paid more than the plaintiff.50 Yet, while it is the most 
common form of proof, a direct or exact comparator is not required by the statutory 
text of Title VII.51 This provides a strategic advantage to plaintiffs for using Title 
VII over the EPA. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production only—not the 
burden of proof—shifts to the employer defendant to articulate any “legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason” for the pay disparity, which the plaintiff can then rebut 
by proving the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for the real reason, sex 
discrimination.52 While the “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” under Title VII 
functions much as the “any other factor other than sex” defense under the EPA, an 
important difference is that the plaintiff maintains the burden of persuasion 
throughout the entire Title VII claim.53 Under the EPA, once the employee makes 
out a prima facie case, the employer must disprove pay discrimination; under Title 
VII, the employee must ultimately prove discrimination. 
After enacting two statutory routes for plaintiffs to litigate sex-based pay 
discrimination claims, Congress and the courts struggled with how to create 
                                                   
disparate impact theory. See Sharon Rabin–Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. OF 
PENN. J. OF BUS. L. 807, 827–28, 839–40 (2010). A complete discussion of applying the 
Title VII frameworks of proof to pay discrimination cases is beyond this Essay’s focus 
on the EPA. For further discussion, see, e.g., id. at 823–37; Deborah Brake, What Counts 
as ‘Discrimination’ in Ledbetter and the Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 
661–64 (2008). 
 49. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (enunciating the elements that a plaintiff 
must show to make out a prima facie Title VII claim in the context of racial 
discrimination).  
 50. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 919, 943–44 (2016). 
 51. See id.; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 744 (2011); 
Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 839, 856–57 (2002). Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, 
The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 204 
(2009) (acknowledging that at least one court has rejected comparator proof as 
necessary, but still noting the relevance of comparators). 
 52. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–03 (noting in a failure to rehire case, 
employee’s participation in unlawful conduct sufficed as employer’s legitimate non-
discriminatory reason). 
 53. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  
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uniformity between the two approaches. When it passed Title VII, Congress 
specifically included the Bennett Amendment (named for its Senator sponsor), which 
stated that “[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII] for 
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in . . . compensation . . . if such 
differentiation is authorized by the [EPA].”54 This “technical correction” clarified 
that affirmative defenses available under the EPA would also constitute legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons to rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case under Title VII.55 
For the first near-decade after the statutes were enacted, a federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission interpretation presumed that, to make out 
a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must also meet the “equal work” test required to 
make out an EPA claim.56 So interpreted, many plaintiffs pursued claims under the 
EPA, given its advantageous burden of proof framework.57 
Then, in 1981 in County of Washington v. Gunther,58 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that, while the Bennett Amendment allowed an employer to raise the EPA’s 
defenses in a Title VII claim, it did not also require Title VII plaintiffs to prove they 
were performing “equal work.”59 So long as a plaintiff could create an inference of 
pay discrimination because of sex, they could pursue a Title VII claim.60 This made 
a prima facie case under Title VII much easier for plaintiffs to prove; moreover, 
Title VII provided greater possible remedies, including compensatory and punitive 
damages, where the EPA allowed for only equitable and liquidated damages.61 
These advantages provided the incentive for more plaintiffs to pursue pay 
                                                   
 54. Bennett Amendment, Pub. L. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964), 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012). 
 55. See id.; County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171–75 (1981). 
 56. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7(a) (1966) 
(explaining that “the standards of ‘equal pay for equal work’ set forth in the Equal Pay 
Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to 
Title VII”). The EEOC rescinded this guideline in 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972). See 
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 177. 
 57. See, e.g., Albert H. Ross & Frank V. McDermott Jr., The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A Decade 
of Enforcement, 16 B.C. L. REV. 1–2, 20, 72–73 (1974). 
 58. 452 U.S. at 177–80. 
 59. Id. at 168, 180.  
 60. Id. at 180. See also U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 47, at 10-V. 
 61. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b), with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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discrimination claims under Title VII, despite the benefit of the EPA’s burden-
shifting structure.62 
Both the minimum labor standard, wage and hour approach of the EPA 
and the individual rights, antidiscrimination approach of Title VII have provided 
redress against pay discrimination for countless plaintiffs whose facts allowed them 
to succeed using one or both approaches. Yet proving pay discrimination under 
either legal framework is difficult, particularly given that an employer’s defense can 
include any reason that is not “sex,” even if it may incorporate sex stereotypes or 
past sex discrimination.63 The fact that advancement in the pay gap stalled nearly 
two decades ago is, in part, due to the limited reach of both statutory approaches. 
As a result, advocates and legislators have reconsidered their options, looking once 
again to the more strict liability approach of the EPA, and the potential to narrow 
its defenses.64 
While the burden shifting framework of the EPA offers, perhaps, its greatest 
advantage, there is another potential benefit to reviving a focus on the EPA: the 
limitation on the ability of employees to waive their rights under the EPA, given that 
it was incorporated into the FLSA. To consider this issue requires looking back to 
the passage of the FLSA in 1938 and its amendment by the EPA in 1963.  
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act, the Public Interest, and Nonwaivable Rights 
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 as part of President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal package of federal programs and statutes to help the U.S. 
economy recover from the Great Depression.65 The FLSA established three main 
minimum labor standards that applied to employers who engaged in interstate 
commerce. It placed limitations on child labor, established a federal minimum 
                                                   
 62. See, e.g., Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Under Title 
VII . . . the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times to show discriminatory 
intent. . . . In contrast, ‘the Equal Pay Act creates a type of strict liability in that no 
intent to discriminate need be shown.’ . . . [U]nder the [EPA], a plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving a prima facie case. If successful, the burden of proof (persuasion) shifts 
to the defendant to prove that the wage disparity is attributable to one of that Act’s four 
affirmative defenses . . . Thus, the risk of nonpersuasion rests with the employer on the 
ultimate issue of liability. Under Title VII, . . . [t]he risk of nonpersuasion, then, is 
always (except for a few exceptions) on a Title VII plaintiff.” (citations omitted)).  
 63. See infra Part II.B. 
 64. See id.; see also Brake, supra note 35, at 890–91. 
 65. See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum 
Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/flsa1938 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2018). 
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hourly wage, and instituted overtime premium pay for hours worked beyond forty 
hours each week for certain employees.66 The FLSA was a companion bill to the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) (also known as the Wagner Act), 
which had established the right for workers to form unions to bargain collectively 
with employers about wages and other terms of work.67 Together, the two bills 
sought to improve exploitative working conditions and help resolve significant labor 
strife that had led to crippling work stoppages in the 1920s and ‘30s.68 Both Acts also 
established federal agency mechanisms, through the National Labor Relations 
Board and the U.S. Department of Labor, to help enforce the statutory schemes.69  
While the FLSA was enacted, in part, to provide redress to exploited 
workers, it was designed to serve a greater public purpose. Both President Roosevelt 
and Congress viewed the Act as a way to pull people out of poverty and improve the 
struggling U.S. economy by raising basic living standards and spreading work 
among the unemployed.70 The Act’s introductory section details Congressional 
findings of “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers,” that not only “constitute[] an unfair method of competition” and “lead[] 
to labor disputes,” but that also “obstruct[],” “burden[],” and “interfere[] 
with . . . commerce.”71 Based on such findings, the Act’s stated policy was “to 
correct and . . . eliminate [such] conditions . . . without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power” of workers.72 
The legislative record of debate over the bill reflects similar purposes. In his 
statement introducing the bill, Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson 
identified the effort as the chance to act upon the “commonplace [principle] that it 
is bad for America—economically as well as socially—to have child labor, sweated 
                                                   
 66. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); Grossman, supra 
note 65. 
 67. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219; National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
269 (2012). 
 68. See Grossman, supra note 65 (citing FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES (1937); FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW (1946); ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1960)). 
 69. See 29 U.S.C. § 153–155 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2012). 
 70. See Grossman, supra note 65. 
 71. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
 72. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2012). 
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labor, low standards of living, inhumane and unhealthy working conditions.”73 
Jackson’s role at the outset of the debate was to clarify the constitutional basis for 
regulating interstate commerce, necessary because a prior attempt to regulate wages 
and hours had been struck down as unconstitutional several years earlier.74 Jackson 
identified congressional power to regulate interstate commerce that “offend[s] 
against sound national policy,” including unfair competition: 
 
Congress has the power to . . . prohibit the securing of a 
competitive advantage in interstate commerce through the 
adoption of oppressive and sweatshop labor conditions. . . . All of 
the labor practices attacked by this bill are related. All are types of 
oppression utilized for the purpose of gaining unfair advantage in 
interstate commerce. One employer cuts wages, while another 
employs child labor, and still another employ sweatshop conditions, 
and all of these practices are a part of the vicious competition used 
in forcing down labor standards. . . .75 
 
Likewise, statements by Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, one of the 
architects of the Act, focused on its ameliorative impact on the overall U.S. economy 
during an economic downturn.76 Perkins described the bill as “a stabilizer of 
employment, of income, of the market for goods, of production,” as well as “a 
stabilizer of price, preventing the undue and disturbing fluctuations . . . which so 
frequently lead to such downward markets as we have experienced.”77 She also 
identified the bill’s ability to increase the purchasing power of previously 
underemployed and underpaid workers, viewing the Act as a “buttress” to attempts 
“to solve the problems of low wages, long hours, and low living standards, which 
                                                   
 73. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: J. Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. On 
Educ. And Labor and the H. Comm. On Labor, 75th Cong. 1 (1937) (statement of Robert H. 
Jackson, U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
 74. See Grossman, supra note 65. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down prior legislation—the National Industrial Recovery 
Act—as unconstitutional. 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). In the famous “switch in time 
that saved nine,” Justice Roberts later changed his position, upholding a challenge to a 
state minimum wage law in W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 which paved 
the way for the FLSA to be held constitutional. See Parrish, 300 U.S. at 398–400 (1937).  
 75. 75th Cong., supra note 73, at 2–3, 7. 
 76. 75th Cong., supra note 73, at 173–74 (statement of Hon. Frances Perkins, Sec’y of 
Labor). 
 77. Id. 
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mean[t] a low purchasing market for the product of manufactured goods.”78 In 
addition, Perkins noted that, where states had reduced working hours to eight-hour 
days, both public health and community involvement improved.79 
Given the shared purpose of spreading employment and reducing unfair 
competition, the FLSA prohibited individual employees from agreeing to waive their 
statutory rights. Regulations enforcing the statute make clear that the FLSA’s 
“minimum standards . . . may be exceeded, but cannot be waived or reduced.”80 
Case law interpreting the Act follows course. In 1945, in Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil,81 
an early case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee could not 
waive his entitlement to liquidated damages for a FLSA violation, the Court 
explained the connection between the statutory public interest in the FLSA and its 
nonwaivability: 
 
[A] statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the 
public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or 
release contravenes the statutory policy. . . . Where a private right 
is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, 
waiver of a right so charged . . . with the public interest will not be 
allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was 
designed to effectuate. . . . The statute was a recognition of 
the . . . unequal bargaining power as between employer and 
employee . . . requir[ing] federal compulsory legislation to prevent 
private contracts . . . which endangered national health and 
efficiency and . . . interstate commerce.”82 
 
As the Court recognized, the FLSA created minimum labor standards to correct a 
balance of power, in which desperate workers might be willing to accept substandard 
                                                   
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 188 (statement of Hon. Frances Perkins, Sec’y of Labor). 
 80. 29 C.F.R. § 541.4 (2014) (“Employers must comply, for example, with any Federal, 
State or municipal laws, regulations or ordinances establishing a higher minimum wage 
or lower maximum workweek than those established under the Act. Similarly, 
employers, on their own initiative or under a collective bargaining agreement with a 
labor union, are not precluded by the Act from providing a wage higher than the 
statutory minimum, a shorter workweek than the statutory maximum, or a higher 
overtime premium (double time, for example) than provided by the Act.”) 
 81. 324 U.S. 697 (1945). 
 82. Id. at 704–707. 
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wages or conditions, hurting the larger society.83 As a result, the Court explained, 
“No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would 
nullify the purposes of the Act.”84 
In a series of more recent cases, federal courts have recognized the FLSA’s 
“‘broad remedial intent,’ to address ‘unfair method[s] of competition in commerce’ 
that cause ‘conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,’”85 which 
necessitates limits on its waiver. Federal courts have held that individual FLSA 
plaintiffs may not waive their right to a minimum wage,86 an overtime premium,87 
or even to the arguably more procedural (as opposed to substantive) right of 
participating in a FLSA collective action.88 
                                                   
 83. Id. at 707. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Gaffers v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 829, 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (citations 
omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 900 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2018).  
 86. O’Brien v. Ecotech Const. Services, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(“[W]here a right is conferred for the benefit of the public at large, and the 
implementation of that right requires a limitation of the directly-involved individuals’ 
freedom of contract, the argument in favor of nonwaivability is particularly 
compelling.”). 
 87. Craig v. Bridges Bros. Trucking LLC, 823 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has already closed that door and ‘frequently emphasized the 
nonwaivable nature of an individual employee’s right . . . to overtime pay under the 
Act.’ . . . ‘FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this 
would nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was 
designed to effectuate.’” (citation omitted)); Killon v. KeHE Distribs., LLC, 761 F.3d 
574, 587 (6th Cir. 2014); Letner v. City of Oliver Springs, 545 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724 
(E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“[A]n employee’s right to be paid overtime compensation in 
accordance with the FLSA, and to pursue claims for damages allowable by the Act are 
statutory rights which affect the public interest and, hence, rights which may not be 
waived by an employee.”); Usery v. Godwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1270 
(W.D. Mich. 1976) (“To permit an employer to thus reap the benefit of his own 
wrongdoing . . . would defeat the purposes of the Act, for it would reduce the incentives 
to reduce hours of work and spread employment, deprive employees of the intended 
extra compensation for overtime work, and subject complying employers to unfair 
competition in the marketplace.”). 
 88. Gaffers, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 840 (“[T]his right to a collective action is not ‘merely 
procedural,’ and the law recognizes no such distinction between ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ rights under the FLSA.” (citing Boaz, 725 F.3d at 606)). But see Feamster 
v. Compucom Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 722190 at *9 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“The court believes 
that the holding in Brooklyn Savings Bank is narrow and applies only when employees 
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C. The Equal Pay Act as a Subset of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Its Interests 
  Twenty-five years after the passage of the FLSA, Congress revisited similar 
public interests when it amended the statute to add the Equal Pay Act of 1963.89 
Like President Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress before them, President 
Kennedy and the Civil Rights-era Congress viewed sex discrimination in 
compensation as both a social and an economic injustice.90 And like the FLSA, the 
EPA included congressional findings that having “wage differentials based on sex” 
in commerce “depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for 
their health and efficiency.”91 As the bill explained, underpaying female workers not 
only “prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor resources” and 
“cause[s] labor disputes,” which then “obstruct[s]” and “burdens commerce and the 
free flow of goods, . . . constitut[ing] an unfair method of competition.”92 Given 
these findings, the “declared . . . policy” of the EPA was “to correct the[se] 
conditions” through regulation of interstate commerce.93 
While the EPA is often viewed as a corollary to civil rights protections 
focused on individual attainment of equality,94 the legislative record of the EPA tells 
a different story. In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Pat McNamara began 
by linking the EPA to the FLSA it sought to amend, identifying equal pay by sex as 
the FLSA’s fourth minimum labor standard: 
 
                                                   
waive their rights to the protections afforded in the FLSA, specifically the rights to 
overtime wages, minimum wages, and liquidated damages. . . . [T]he court does not 
find the holding . . . instructive regarding waiver of the right to participate in collective 
action litigation.”). Note, however, that employees may be required to arbitrate their 
collective FLSA claims where governed by predispute arbitration clauses. See Epic Sys. 
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018); Rodriguez-Depena v. Parts Auth., Inc., 
877 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 2046393 (June 11, 2018). 
 89. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963: 
EDITOR’S NOTE, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epa.cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 
2018); Equal Pay Act for Women Enacted, CQ ALMANAC 1963 511–13 (19th ed., 1964), 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal63-1315824. 
 90. See John F. Kennedy, Remarks Upon Signing the Equal Pay Act, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 10, 1963), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/? 
pid=9267; Ross & McDermott, supra note 57, at 2–6. 
 91. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) 
(2012). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Ross & McDermott, supra note 57, at 17–20. 
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As we all know, the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that workers 
must be paid a decent minimum wage; that if employees must put 
in long hours, they must be paid at an overtime rate; and that 
children may only be employed under rigid conditions which 
protect their health and safety. The bill I now introduce would add 
one additional fair labor standard to the act; namely, that 
employees doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless 
of sex.95 
 
The EPA, he noted, would establish “a most worthy national policy” with which 
both employers and labor unions could readily comply due to their long-established 
familiarity with existing fair labor standards provisions.96 In supporting the bill, 
McNamara cited the reliance of most U.S. industry “upon the contributions of 
American women,” noting that “in modern day America, woman’s role as a 
provider, for not only herself but her family, has become an essential role.”97 
Likewise, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz offered testimony on the 
public interests served by the EPA, noting “the necessity to utilize fully the skills of 
women in our labor force,” whose participation “is expected to increase to more 
than 30 million within the next 10 years.”98 Thus, like the FLSA before it, “[e]qual 
pay legislation is an essential step toward the administration’s goals of economic 
growth and social justice,” whose “need and justification . . . [is] . . . a matter of 
common knowledge.”99 As Wirtz explained, women were particularly 
disadvantaged by their lack of equal bargaining power, given that only one in seven 
women in the workforce were covered by a collective bargaining agreement.100 And 
the impact on women’s earnings “has an undesirable effect on many aspects of the 
life of our Nation,” including “affect[ing] adversely the general purchasing power 
and the living standard of workers,” “offer[ing] an unfair competitive advantage” 
for certain employers, and “prevent[ing] the maximum utilization of workers skills 
to the detriment . . . of production.”101  
                                                   
 95. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, Legis. History of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Amending 
Sec. 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 88th 
Cong., H.R. 6060 and S. 1409, 1 (1963) (Statement of Sen. Pat McNamara). 
 96. Id. at 4.  
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. Id. at 33–34 (Letter & Statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Sec’y of Labor). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 35.  
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A number of Congresspeople testified that, as of 1963, women had become 
the heads of many families or were contributing significant family income, making 
the underpayment of women a matter of general economic concern.102 Moreover, 
both Secretary Wirtz and other members of Congress noted the detrimental impact 
that pay discrimination against women had on the wages and employment of men. 
As one Senator explained, equal pay was a principle of vital importance during an 
economic downturn because hiring women to do comparable work at lower pay 
than men might be used to undercut the wage rate of men, or to displace men from 
the workforce.103 
Importantly, because the EPA was drafted and adopted as one section 
within the FLSA, the regulatory architecture of the FLSA applies similarly. This 
means that, like FLSA rights, EPA rights cannot be waived by private individuals, 
because those rights derive from a statute with a broader public purpose. In 1970, 
in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,104 an early case applying the EPA, the United States 
                                                   
 102. Id. at 55 (Statement of Rep. Frances P. Bolton) (“There are 24 million women in the 
labor force today and by 1970 we shall have over 30 million. Most women work to 
contribute to essential living expenses for themselves or their families. For example, 
over 6 million single women workers support themselves; over 2 million working 
women are heads of families; others are the primary wage earner in the family although 
not technically the family head. Married women who are not the primary wage earner 
in the family work to raise family living standards and to send children through college 
in many, many families, but there are others who must work to give their children 
proper education. The contribution of these women to the Nation’s productive 
resources must be recognized, encouraged, and maximized.”); Id. at 67 (Statement of 
Mr. Staggers) (“Most women work to contribute to essential living expenses. Millions 
of single women work to support themselves; many working women are heads of 
families, and others are the primary wage earner in the family although they are not 
technically the family head. Many, many thousands of single women support one or 
both parents and in many cases other members of their families who are in need.”). 
 103. Id. at 63–64 (Statement of Mr. Rivers of Alaska) (“Another desirable product of this 
legislation would be discontinuance of the process of allowing unscrupulous employers 
to profit by exploiting women for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage, while 
at the same time rejecting the services of men to whom they would have to pay better 
wages. Thus this legislation would establish fair play in the area of employment and 
wages for both men and women as well as improving the situation for our considerate 
and scrupulous employers by protecting them against the inroads of unfair competition 
in this regard.”); Id. at 66–67 (Statement of Mr. Staggers) (“If both are paid equally for 
equal work, not only will women be protected but men as well. The employer who pays 
a woman a lower wage for the same work will also hire cheap labor. In areas of chronic 
unemployment, this equal pay legislation will protect the jobs of men as well as assure 
women who must work that they will receive a fair wage.”) 
 104. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that “[t]he Act was intended as a 
broad charter of women’s rights in the economic field.”105 Its purpose was to root 
out sex-based stereotypes about women’s “inferiority” in the market sphere and 
“eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for female 
workers and the economic and social consequences which flow from it.”106 Four 
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored this legislative intent in Corning 
Glass Works v. Brennan,107 one of the only decisions on the EPA to reach the Supreme 
Court.108 As the Court explained,  
 
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act ‘(r)ecognizing the weaker 
bargaining position of many women and believing that 
discrimination in wage rates represented unfair employer 
exploitation of this source of cheap labor’ . . . [It considered] 
evidence of the many families dependent on the income of working 
women . . . The whole purpose of the Act was to require that these 
depressed wages be raised, in part as a matter of simple justice to 
the employees themselves, but also as a matter of market 
economics, since Congress recognized as well that discrimination in 
wages on the basis of sex ‘constitutes an unfair method of 
competition.’109 
 
With this purpose in mind, federal courts have, in more recent cases, held 
that, like other FLSA rights, EPA rights cannot be waived. In one case, Boaz v. FedEx 
Customer Info. Serv. Inc.,110 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
struck down an employment contract that imposed a six-month limitation on the 
employee plaintiff’s ability to raise pay claims as an unlawful waiver of EPA rights, 
noting that “the Supreme Court’s rationale [in Corning Glass Works] for barring 
waiver of FLSA claims appears fully applicable to claims under the Equal Pay 
Act.”111 As a result, the Sixth Circuit explained, “[a]n employer who pays women 
                                                   
 105. Id. at 265. 
 106. Id. See also Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing the EPA’s 
statutory purpose); Ende v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univ., 757 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 
1985); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat. Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 107. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 206–07. 
 110. 725 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 111. Id. at 605, 607. 
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less than a lawful wage might gain the same competitive advantage as an employer 
who pays less than minimum wage.”112 In another, Fontenot v. Safety Council of Sw. 
La.,113 the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted 
summary judgment to the employee plaintiff on the issue of whether agreeing to an 
employment contract waived her EPA claim.114 “[T]he Sixth Circuit and Eleventh 
Circuit have considered the issue of whether an employee can explicitly waive an 
EPA claim,” the District Court explained, “concluding that allowing such a waiver 
would be against the legislative policy underlying the EPA.”115 Moreover, the court 
noted, “[b]oth Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent indicate that a claim 
under the EPA, which is incorporated within the FLSA, may not be waived.”116  
Based on Congressional intent, and as recognized by the Supreme Court 
and several lower federal courts in application, the EPA, as part of the FLSA, serves 
not only to correct the exploitation of individual workers, but also to remedy 
inequitable bargaining power between employer and employee, unfair competition 
by unscrupulous employers, and the social and economic harms that result from 
both. Because these interests impact society as a whole, neither the minimum labor 
standards that require a minimum wage and an overtime premium, nor the 
minimum labor standard that requires equal pay for equal work regardless of sex, 
can be waived by individuals. 
                                                   
 112. Id. at 607. 
 113. 2017 WL 2831248 (W.D. La., June 28, 2017). 
 114. Id. at *7–8 (“[Plaintiff] contends that she has not waived her EPA claim by freely 
entering into her contract with [defendant employer] . . . [T]he Court notes the 
supporting case law that an EPA claim cannot be waived. The EPA was enacted in 
1963 and incorporated into the [FLSA] of 1938 . . . Prior to the EPA’s enactment, the 
Supreme Court held that an employee’s rights under the FLSA are unwaivable. The 
Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff may waive an 
EPA claim, however, it has recently recognized that “[t]he general rule establishes that 
FLSA claims . . . cannot be waived.”). 
 115. Id. at *7 (citing Boaz, 725 F.3d at 607; Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 
901, 906 (11th Cir. 1987) (“stating in dicta that allowing an employee to prospectively 
waive her rights under the EPA would thwart the EPA's legislative policy,” id. at *7, n. 
116). 
 116. Id. at *8 (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707; Jewell Ridge Coal 
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, UMWA, 325 U.S. 161, 167 (1945); Bodle v. TXL Mortg. 
Corp., 788 F.3d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYER PAY-SETTING PRACTICES 
A. The Modern Pay Gap as a Matter of Public Interest 
In the over five decades since the passage of the Equal Pay Act and Title 
VII, laws prohibiting sex-based pay discrimination have helped contribute to major 
economic gains by women in the workforce.117 Yet even the most recent data on the 
gender pay gap shows that the public interests behind the passage of the EPA have 
yet to be achieved and remain a significant concern to women, their families, and 
the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Women’s participation in the paid workforce has grown dramatically over 
time. In 1948, only about one-third (32.7%) of all U.S. women participated in the 
labor market, and women made up just over one-quarter (28.6%) of the U.S. 
workforce.118 By 2016, over half (56.8%) of all women worked for pay, and women 
composed nearly half (46.8%) of the paid labor force.119 Despite this growth in 
women’s workforce participation rates, earnings between women and men have not 
kept pace. Using one measure of the gender pay gap—comparing annual earnings 
of all women and men engaged in full-time year-round work—women’s earnings 
have increased from an average of 57 cents on the dollar earned by men in 1973 to 
80 cents on the dollar today.120 When hourly wages are compared, which includes 
part-time workers and adjusts for men’s greater number of hours worked per year, 
women earn an average of 83 cents for each dollar men earn per hour.121 The wage 
gap is worse for women of color: in recent aggregated data, African-American 
women earn only 63 cents annually, 65 cents hourly, and Latina women earn only 
54 cents annually, 58 cents hourly, for every dollar earned by white men.122  
                                                   
 117. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22. 
 118. WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY 
SEX, RACE AND HISPANIC ETHNICITY, 1948–2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES, 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/lf_prate_sex_race_hisp_2016_tx
t.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2018). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22; 
See ELISE GOULD ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., WHAT IS THE GENDER PAY GAP AND 
IS IT REAL? THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HOW WOMEN ARE PAID LESS THAN MEN 
AND WHY IT CAN’T BE EXPLAINED AWAY (2016), https://www.epi.org/ 
publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-and-is-it-real/. 
 121. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94; GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 1, 6.  
 122. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 11 (providing annual figures from 2016); GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 13 
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There is significant debate over how to measure the gender pay gap, a full 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Essay.123 Yet even when controlling 
for most relevant factors—for example, education, experience, hours worked, days 
worked, age, race, geography—and even comparing similar model workers doing 
the same job in the same office, economists find that an unexplained pay gap of 7 to 
13.5% remains.124 While research suggests that one-third to one-half of the gender 
pay gap can be attributed to actual demographic differences between men and 
women in hours worked or time off for childbearing or rearing (and, to a lesser 
degree, remaining differences in experience or education levels), that leaves up to 
one-half of the gender pay gap still caused by gender workforce segregation and 
discrimination.125  
                                                   
(providing hourly figures from 2015). Asian-American women now earn, on average, 
more than white women, with a median hourly wage of $18 to white women’s $17. 
Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gap Persists in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (July 1, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/. 
 123. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94. 
 124. See id.; GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 7, 36 n. 9–10 (citing one study that found a 
13.5% difference when industry, occupation, and work hours were controlled to model 
“a man and woman with identical education and years of experience working side-by-
side in cubicles,” and another that found a disparity of 8.4% remained after controlling 
for not only education, industry, occupation, experience level, and geography, but also 
race, ethnicity, and metropolitan region); AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 20 (citing studies that found a gender wage gap of 7% one year after college 
graduation and 12% ten years later even after controlling for “college major, 
occupation, economic sector, hours worked, months unemployed since graduation, 
GPA, type of undergraduate institution, institution selectivity, age, geographical region, 
and marital status”). 
 125. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The 
Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 21913, 2016), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w21913.pdf (“[W]hile the share of the gender wage gap due to human capital 
(education and experience) has declined noticeably, the share accounted for by loca-
tional factors like occupation and industry actually increased from 27% of the 1980 gap 
to 49% of the much smaller 2010 gap.”); Goldin & Sokoloff, supra note 2, at 1098 (at-
tributing 32–42% of the gender pay gap among college graduates working full-time 
year-round to the gap between occupations); GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 20–21; 
ARIANE HEGEWISCH & HEIDI HARTMANN, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH., 
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP: A JOB HALF DONE 16 
(2014), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/iwpr-export/publi-
cations/C419.pdf. 
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Perhaps most shockingly, improvement in reducing the overall gender pay 
gap has been stalled for two decades, with no significant improvement in women’s 
earnings as compared to men’s (ranging between 75 and 80 cents on the dollar) since 
2000126—a clear indication that the public policy goals behind the EPA have yet to 
be attained. Moreover, the impact to the U.S. economy is sustained and severe. 
Women have higher rates of poverty due, in part, to the gender wage gap.127 One 
group of researchers estimate that if the gender pay gap was closed, the poverty rate 
among all women would be reduced by half.128 Data shows that, during the course 
of her lifetime, an average working woman will lose over $500,000 due to the gender 
pay gap—over $800,000 if she has a college degree.129 The pay gap also reduces 
women’s economic security once they retire, in the form of reduced Social Security 
and retirement benefits tied to the depressed wages they earned while employed.130 
Because women now provide a greater proportion of family income, 
unequal pay that affects women also affects all U.S. families and children. 
Demographic data shows that, today, 70% of all women and 75% of single women 
                                                   
 126. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 588–94; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 4; GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 8. 
 127. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; see, e.g., AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra 
note 22, at 4 (citing JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND 
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 (2017) (reporting that, depending on age, 
11%–13% of women live below the federal poverty line as compared to 8%–10% of 
men)). 
 128. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, HOW EQUAL PAY FOR WORKING WOMEN WOULD 
REDUCE POVERTY AND GROW THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1 (2014), 
https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/iwpr-export/publica-
tions/C411.pdf. 
 129. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; see generally SUSAN BISOM-RAPP & MALCOLM 
SARGEANT, LIFETIME DISADVANTAGE, DISCRIMINATION AND THE GENDERED 
WORKFORCE 115–30 (2016) (describing the impact of unequal pay over a woman’s 
lifetime); GOULD ET AL., supra note 120, at 7 (citing CYNTHIA HESS ET AL., INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE STATES 50 (May 
2015)). 
 130. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 5 (citing JOCELYN FISHER & JEFF HAYES, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RESEARCH, 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE INCOMES OF OLDER AMERICANS: 
DIFFERENCES BY GENDER, AGE, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND MARTIAL STATUS (Aug. 
2013)). 
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who have children under eighteen work.131 Nearly two-thirds of women earn at least 
one-quarter of family income,132 and 42% of women with children under the age of 
18 are the sole or primary earner in the family.133 One study documents that, if single 
mothers who worked received equal pay, two-thirds would earn more.134  
It should come as no surprise, then, that the impact of the pay gap on U.S. 
women and their families reverberates throughout the U.S. economy. First, cutting 
poverty rates in half for women and households headed by single mothers would 
relieve taxpayers and the government as a whole from necessary social supports. For 
example, one study estimated that, if the pay gap for women were eliminated, 
women’s increased earnings would amount to sixteen times the government 
expenditures on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in 2015.135 This loss of 
income translates into loss of productivity—and purchasing power—in the economy 
overall. According to researchers, if women were paid equally, the U.S. economy 
“would have produced additional income of $512.6 billion,” which “represents 
2.8% of 2016 gross domestic product.”136 Another study estimated that achieving 
gender parity in the workplace worldwide could add between $12 and $28 trillion 
to annual global GDP in 2025.137 
As current data shows, despite major gains in women’s advancement, the 
same concerns that motivated the passage of the Equal Pay Act remain today: risks 
of unfair competition, exploitation of female workers’ unequal bargaining position, 
                                                   
 131. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. A SNAPSHOT 
OF WORKING MOTHERS 1 (Apr. 2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/A-Snapshot-of-Working-Mothers.pdf. 
 132. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 5 (bring the total to 63% in 2012). 
 133. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 22, 
at 5 (citing Sarah Jane Glynn, Breadwinning Mothers Are Increasingly the U.S. Norm, CTR. 
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/women/reports/2016/12/19/295203/breadwinning-mothers-are-increasingly-
the-u-s-norm/). 
 134. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; HARTMANN ET AL., supra note 128, at 1. 
 135. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; MILLI ET AL., supra note 31, at 2. 
 136. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; MILLI ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.  
 137. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 599–601; Jonathan Woetzel et al., The Power Of Parity: 
How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 Trillion To Global Growth, MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INSTITUTE (2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employ-
ment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-
growth. 
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and the resulting costs to the U.S. economy, health, and welfare.138 As a result, 
advocates and legislators at both the federal and state level are considering ways to 
amend and strengthen the federal EPA and its state equivalents.139 Yet even under 
existing law, based on the EPA’s placement within the text of the FLSA, there is 
room to argue that some employer pay-setting practices operate as, in effect, forced 
waivers of the EPA’s nonwaivable rights. 
B. Employer Pay-Setting Practices as Impermissible Waivers of FLSA Rights 
Both the high hurdle for a plaintiff-employee to make out a prima facie case 
of unequal pay for “equal work” and the wide berth of a defendant-employer’s 
defenses limit the reach of the Equal Pay Act.140 But it is the affirmative defense that 
allows an employer to escape liability if it can prove that a pay disparity was the 
result of “any other factor other than sex”141 that most directly implicates the public 
interest. In particular, reconsidering the public nature of the harms the EPA sought 
to redress and the fact that EPA rights are nonwaivable calls into question two 
common practices employers use to set pay: individual negotiation and reliance on 
an employee’s prior salary.  
1.  Setting Pay by Individual Negotiation 
In the professional sector, employers often establish an employee’s pay 
through individual negotiation with the employee seeking to be hired or 
promoted.142 This means that, even if an employer offers two job candidates with 
                                                   
 138. See Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2095 § 2, 115th Cong. (2017); Charles Carver, Formal Training 
Does Not Always Eliminate Gender-Based Negotiation Differences, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 1, 8–9 (2016).  
 139. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 624–31; CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2018); CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.149, § 105A (2018); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 652.220 (2018); Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2095, 115th Cong. (2017); S.819, 115th 
Cong. (2017); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1869, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 819, 115th 
Cong. (2017); S.104, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018); Christian Hetrick, New Jersey Lawmakers 
Overwhelmingly Pass Pay Equity Bill, OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2018), http://observer.com 
/2018/03/new-jersey-lawmakers-overwhelmingly-pass-pay-equity-bill/; Kate Niel-
son, States Notch Multiple Equal Pay Victories in 2017, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN (Oct. 
13, 2017), https://www.aauw.org/2017/10/13/state-equal-pay-victories-in-2017. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 36–45; Equal Work, supra note 21, at 605. 
 141. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(iv) (2012). 
 142. See, e.g., Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender Difference in 
Salary Negotiation is Not a Factor other than Sex under the Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO. J. GENDER 
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identical resumes the exact same job at the exact same pay, the candidates’ resulting 
salaries may be different based on each one’s ability to successfully negotiate for a 
higher starting salary. Once starting salaries are set, all future pay raises relate back 
to the original salary, compounding any pay differential exponentially into the 
future. 
Many federal courts to consider the issue have allowed a “market 
defense,”143 holding that, where an employer sets pay through individual negotiation 
and the employee agrees to what the employer offers, this serves as a “factor other 
than sex” that justifies any pay disparity, excusing the employer from liability under 
the EPA.144 Within certain appellate circuits and in more recent cases, other courts 
have disagreed, holding that, without an additional justification such as a crucial 
recruiting need, relying solely on negotiation or market factors may violate the 
EPA.145  
                                                   
& L. 1, 3–9 (2009); Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market 
Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 178 (2011). 
 143. See, e.g., Elzer, supra note 142, at 21–22; Porter & Vartanian, supra note 142, at 162; 
Rabin–Margalioth, supra note 48, at 807–11; Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 581 (2001) (reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. 
BRIDGES LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL 
PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)).  
 144. See, e.g., Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding 
employer need not ignore market wages when setting pay); Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & 
Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (excusing pay 
differential based on “prevailing market rates”); Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706 
(8th Cir. 1980) (holding employer may consider market value of employee’s skills); 
Ottaviani v. SUNY New Paltz, 679 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that a 
market-based pay differential is allowed); Ciardella v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 671 F. 
Supp. 699 (D. Nev. 1987) (stating that market-based pay differentials are considered a 
“factor other than sex”).  
 145. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 634; see, e.g., Thibodeaux-Woody v. Hous. Cmty. Coll., 
593 Fed. App’x 280, 283–85 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that male employee’s ability to 
negotiate higher pay is not a “factor other than sex”); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. 
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating “the fact that the employer's 
bargaining power is greater with respect to women than . . . men is not the kind of 
factor [other than sex] Congress had in mind,” and rejecting employer’s argument that 
it paid male employees more “because it could not get them for less”); King v. Acosta 
Sales & Mktg., Inc., 678 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that, while the employer 
need not “ignore” market factors, it failed to prove its justification “actually account[ed] 
for the [pay] difference”); Leatherwood v. Anna’s Linens Co., 384 Fed. App’x 853, 860 
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a staffing shortage” and “need to lure [the comparator 
employee] away from a competitor” justified pay difference); Mulhall v. Advance Sec., 
Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994) (denying summary judgment to employer who failed 
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When an individual employee in need of a job is left to negotiate with an 
employer, there is an unequal balance of bargaining power. It was this very concern 
that led, in part, to the passage of both the National Labor Relations Act, to 
encourage the formation of unions to bargain collectively, and the FLSA, to set 
minimum labor standards.146 In passing the EPA, legislators were mindful that 
bargaining power was even lower for female workers, whose work traditionally 
commanded lower pay and who were less likely to be represented by a union.147 
Moreover, as a great deal of social science research now documents, women may be 
disadvantaged in pay negotiations by sex stereotypes.148 Gender stereotypes create 
the expectation that women should be cooperative and compliant; if they assert 
themselves by negotiating for higher pay, women may be penalized for doing so, 
where men would not.149 
Compounding this power imbalance is an unfair lack of information among 
employees that skews any negotiation undertaken. Employees rarely discuss their 
pay with each other and are often actively discouraged from doing so, which 
disadvantages female employees who lack needed information for salary 
negotiations—and to ever discover if they are being paid less than male 
                                                   
to prove that “market forces demanded” paying male comparators more); Dreves v. 
Hudson Grp. Retail, LLC, 2013 WL 2634429, at *8 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013) (holding 
that male employee’s ability to negotiate higher pay is not a “factor other than sex”); 
Futran v. Ring Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (rejecting employer’s 
“factor other than sex” defense that it “took considerably less money to attract” plaintiff 
to the job than her male comparator due to “her inferior bargaining position as a 
woman”). 
 146. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.  
 147. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.  
 148. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 633–34; Porter & Vartanian, supra note 142, at 183–
95; Elzer, supra note 142, at 3–9. 
 149. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 633–34; see generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA 
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF AVOIDING NEGOTIATION—
AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (2007); Lisa A. Barron, Ask and You Shall 
Receive? Gender Differences in Negotiators’ Beliefs About Requests for a Higher Salary, 56 HUM. 
REL. 635 (2003); Laura J. Kray et al., Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: An Exploration 
of Stereotype Regeneration, 87 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
386 (2002); Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and 
Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942 (2001); Alice F. 
Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-analysis, 
52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653 (1999). 
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coworkers.150 Scholars and advocates have noted the important role of “pay 
transparency” in exposing and remedying the problem of sex-based pay 
disparities.151  
While a few courts have recognized that women’s unequal bargaining 
power should not justify a pay disparity,152 the goals behind the EPA call for greater 
consideration of this issue. If part of the statutory public interest in passing the EPA 
was to balance the scales between female employee and employer and to root out 
unfair competition caused by exploitation of wages,153 gender pay disparities based 
on market factors or individual negotiation should be impermissible. Just as a female 
employee cannot waive her right to bring an EPA claim because she agreed to an 
employment contract that limited her ability to do so,154 the employee should not be 
held to have waived her right to receive equal pay because she agreed to an 
employment contract—for which she had unequal bargaining power and 
information—that paid her less than an equally-situated man.155 
  Looking to cases in which federal courts held that EPA rights cannot be 
waived provides two examples for how a plaintiff could raise such an argument in a 
lawsuit in which she has met her prima facie case. First, as in Boaz, a plaintiff could 
raise impermissible waiver in response to a defendant’s affirmative defense that 
individual negotiation is a “factor other than sex” that excuses pay discrimination.156 
                                                   
 150. See, e.g., Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay-Secrecy Norms: Analyzing 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 361, 373–77 (2013). 
 151. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 621; see, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, 
Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 963 
(2011) (“The benefit of transparency lies not simply in the final wage results, but in the 
very process of developing a compensation system with clearly understood goals, 
performance standards, and auditing controls.”); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay 
Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2012) (arguing pay transparency may 
“help prevent, root out, and correct the discrimination in the first place”); Cynthia 
Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 781, 783 (2014) (“[M]andatory disclosure of meaningful salary information 
would tend to produce less discrimination, less favoritism, and probably somewhat 
lower disparities overall.”). 
 152. See supra note 145.  
 153. See supra notes 90–93, 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text; Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Serv. 
Inc., 725 F.3d 603, 605, 607 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 155. See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text; Fontenot v. Safety Council of Sw. La., 
2017 WL 2831248, at *7–8 (W.D. La., June 28, 2017). 
 156. See Boaz, 725 F.3d at 605, 607. 
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In addition to arguing that setting pay by individual negotiation is inextricably linked 
to “sex” due to gender biases in negotiation,157 the plaintiff could argue that allowing 
such a defense is allowing the defendant to argue that plaintiff has waived her EPA 
right to equal pay. Second, as in Fortenot, where a defendant argues that agreeing to 
a negotiated salary forecloses a plaintiff’s EPA claim, the plaintiff could take a 
proactive, rather than responsive, stance by seeking her own motion for partial 
summary judgment on the issue, to remove the defendant’s option for raising it 
affirmatively.158  
  Under either procedural approach, the substantive argument is the same. 
First, were it not for the employee’s unequal bargaining power and lack of 
information about male comparator pay, she would not have agreed to unfairly 
lower pay. The fact that she negotiated her agreement, therefore, cannot waive her 
EPA right to be paid equally.159 If, after individual negotiations, the employer agrees 
to pay a male employee more than a female employee for equal work, the employer 
then arguing that the difference is justified by the female employee’s acceptance of 
the pay offered is tantamount to the employer arguing that she waived her right to 
equal pay under the EPA. Second, and more fundamentally, regardless of whether 
the female employee would have agreed otherwise, the statute requires, as a 
minimum labor standard, that she receive equal pay: just as she could not agree to 
accept less than the minimum wage or to forego overtime pay,160 she cannot agree 
to be paid less than a male comparator for equal work.  
2.  Setting Pay by Prior Salary 
A second, and related, common pay-setting practice called into question by 
the statutory public interest behind the EPA is an employer’s use of an employee’s 
prior salary to set current pay. Rather than negotiating generally to set employee 
pay, many employers ask job candidates about the last salary they received, then 
offer slightly more to attract the candidate.161 This means that, even if an employer 
                                                   
 157. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Fontenot, 2017 WL 2831248, at *1–3, 7–8. 
 159. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text; Fontenot, 2017 WL 2831248, at *1–3, 7–
8 (“[Plaintiff] argues that there are ‘hundreds of reported EPA cases’ that involve 
employment situations where the employee freely entered into his or her employment 
situation. [She] claims that, logically, if a plaintiff who voluntarily entered into an 
employment contract were barred from bringing an EPA claim, then EPA claims 
would only lie where an employee accepted a job under duress.” Id. at *3). 
 160. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., Porter & Vartanian, supra note 142, at 183–95. 
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offers two job candidates with identical resumes the exact same job at the exact same 
pay, the candidates’ resulting salaries may be different based on each one’s prior 
salary. The employer may view this practice as equitable if it offers the same 
percentage increase to both candidates over their prior pay.162  
As with the issue of individual pay negotiation, federal courts are divided on 
whether employees’ prior salaries may justify a pay disparity by gender.163 A number 
of federal courts have held that, where the pay disparity is a result of an equal 
increase above a prior starting salary, this constitutes a legitimate “factor other than 
sex” to excuse the employer from liability under the EPA.164 Within certain appellate 
circuits and in more recent cases, other courts have disagreed, holding that prior 
salaries, alone, cannot justify a differential under the EPA165—including a recent, 
notable Ninth Circuit decision overruling its own precedent on the issue.166 
  Like pay disparities caused by individual negotiation, excusing sex-based pay 
differences based on prior salaries runs counter to the public interests inherent in the 
EPA. Due to the long history of undervaluing and underpaying female workers in 
the United States, a female employee’s prior pay may have, itself, been unfairly 
depressed by sex discrimination.167 Setting current pay based not on the value or 
demands of the position but, instead, on the past pay of the person holding the 
position perpetuates this disadvantage into the future.168 Imagine two identical 
                                                   
 162. See, e.g., Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457–58, 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting an 
employer’s policy of paying the same 5% increase over the prior salary of both male 
and female employees where it perpetuated past sex discrimination in violation of the 
EPA), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 S.Ct. 706 (Feb. 25, 2019). 
 163. See Equal Work, supra note 21, at 609–10; see, e.g., Recent Legislation, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1513, 1517 (2018) (citing cases in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits holding prior 
salaries were a justification, and in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, holding otherwise) 
(citations omitted). 
 164. See, e.g., Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005); Taylor v. 
White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003); Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, Inc., 973 F. 
Supp. 1206, 1213 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 165. See, e.g., Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x 500 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby v. 
Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995); Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 
1571 (11th Cir. 1988); Dubowsky v. Stern, Lavinthal, Norgaard & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 
985 (D. N.J. 1996). 
 166. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 467–68 (overruling Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th 
Cir. 1982)), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 S.Ct. 706 (Feb. 25, 2019) (holding that vote 
of Judge Reinhardt, who died 11 days before the en banc decision was finalized, should 
not have been counted to establish a majority). 
 167. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457–58, 468. 
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employees, one male and one female, doing the exact same job in 1962 (before the 
EPA was enacted), for which he is paid $15,000 and she $12,000, simply because 
she is a woman. If, in 1964, they both move to a new employer who offers them 5% 
over their prior salary, again performing the exact same job, some courts would hold 
their pay differential justified as based on a “factor other than sex.”169 Imagine they 
each get a 5% raise every two years until they both retire in 2019; the same courts 
would hold this pay practice beyond the reach of the EPA, despite that he now 
makes about $61,250 and she about $49,000—not to mention any proportionately 
larger bonuses or retirement, social security, or other benefits he received or will 
receive tied to annual pay.170  
If an employer benefits from past sex discrimination, it is engaging in unfair 
competition and exploiting workers in violation of the public interests Congress 
articulated when enacting the EPA.171 Because these harms redound to the 
detriment of society as a whole, not just to individual underpaid female employees, 
the nonwaivability of EPA rights is implicated.172 A plaintiff who has met her prima 
facie case in an EPA lawsuit and whose employer seeks to justify a sex-based pay 
disparity with prior salaries could raise the issue of waiver in the same ways as 
described previously for an employer justification based on individual negotiation.173 
In addition to arguing that, where it perpetuates past sex discrimination, using a 
prior salary is not a “factor other than sex,”174 as in Boaz, a plaintiff could argue that 
allowing such a defense is, in effect, a forced waiver of her EPA right to equal pay.175 
Or, if a defendant argues that an equal percentage raise over a prior salary for men 
and women forecloses a plaintiff’s EPA claim, as in Fortenot, the plaintiff could 
proactively seek her own motion for partial summary judgment on the issue, to 
remove the defendant’s option as an affirmative defense.176 
                                                   
 169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 170. Amounts calculated using a compound interest calculator at 2.5% increase every year 
for 55 years. See, e.g., U.S. SEC, Investor.gov, Compound Interest Calculator, 
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/free-financial-planning-tools/com-
pound-interest-calculator (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) 
 171. See supra Part I.C.  
 172. See supra Part II.A.  
 173. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 457–58, 468 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 175. See Boaz v. FedEx Customer Info. Serv. Inc., 725 F.3d 603, 605, 607 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 176. See Fontenot v. Safety Council of Sw. La., 2017 WL 2831248, at *1–3, 7–8 (W.D. La., 
June 28, 2017). 
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Again, regardless of the procedural mechanism, the substantive arguments 
would be the same, and would echo those raised when arguing against justifying a 
gender-based pay disparity based on individual salary negotiation.177 Were it not 
for the employee’s lower prior salary and lack of information about male comparator 
pay, she would not have agreed to unfairly lower pay. And regardless, if an employer 
intentionally chooses to pay a male employee more than a female employee for equal 
work, the employer then arguing that the difference is justified by the female 
employee’s prior lower salary is, in effect, the employer arguing that the she waived 
her right to equal pay under the EPA. 
Indeed, legislative efforts to amend the EPA and its state equivalents have 
focused on these very pay-setting practices. Among recent state and federal 
legislative proposals are requirements for greater pay transparency by employers, 
calls to redress gender bias in pay negotiations, and prohibitions on employer 
reliance on prior salaries—all of which highlight the persistent public concerns of 
unfair competition, unequal bargaining power, and exploitation of workers.178 In 
the meantime, for those litigating under the current EPA, that the right to equal pay 
for equal work regardless of gender is a statutory right that cannot be waived may 
offer employee plaintiffs additional lines of argument.  
CONCLUSION 
When the Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 as a subsection of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, its placement was not by accident. Legislators 
recognized that sex-based pay discrimination was a societal problem with social and 
economic consequences for the community as a whole.179 The requirement of equal 
pay for equal work regardless of sex was, therefore, added as another in a line of 
minimum labor standards, along with requirements for a minimum wage, overtime 
premiums, and limits on child labor.180 All four minimum labor standards are 
required of covered employers engaging in interstate commerce, unless the 
employer can prove it is entitled to a statutory exception or defense.181 And all four 
standards are designed to benefit the U.S. economy as a whole, by correcting for 
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee, prohibiting unfair 
competition that harms complying businesses, protecting the health and safety of 
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exploited workers, and ensuring maximum contributions to the productivity and 
spending power of the U.S. economy.182  
Due to these critical public interests, Congress designed the FLSA and the 
EPA to ensure that individuals could not waive their rights to each minimum 
standard by private agreement.183 As Congress expressed, and as numerous courts 
have held, allowing individuals to do so would undermine the very statutory intent 
behind the FLSA and the EPA.184 Given the stubborn persistence of the gender pay 
gap—even after more than fifty years during which sex-based pay discrimination 
has been prohibited—it is time to revisit the public aims and associated limits on 
waiver of rights under the EPA. The gender pay gap comes at a cost to us all; it is in 
our shared public interest to redress it.  
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